Tanya Reinhart The Hebrew daily 'Yediot Axaronot' 23.3.00.
(Notes added for Z-net commentaries.)

APARTHEID WON'T BE HERE.
By Tanya Reinhart

Hundred and twenty Palestinian intellectuals issued a message addressed to
the Israeli and Jewish public. "The majority of Palestinians, including the
undersigned, believed that the time was ripe for concluding with the
Israelis a historic agreement", they open, but instead, "the historic
settlement is becoming a settlement between Israelis themselves, not a
settlement with the Palestinians". That's because at the present, the
balance of power is in Israel's favor. "It is clear that the Palestinian
negotiator, whose hands are tied by the overwhelming balance of power
working against him, may be coerced into accepting a humiliating and
degrading settlement."

In an interview to Amira hass in Haaretz (13.3.00) some of the signers add
that we, the Israelis, always believe that we are omnipotent. That's
precisely how we felt at the eve of the Yom Kippur war in 1973. But if we go
on making ourself hated by the whole region, at the end we will remain five
million heroes against more than too hundred million Arabs.

Our proportions in the Arab world are similar to those of the white in South
Africa. Now it may seem to us possible to establish here an Apartheid regime
and imprison the Palestinians in their fenced "states". But in the long run,
our options are precisely as there: join the region in peace, or perish. The
Palestinian intellectuals offer us the option that the black left has
offered to the whites in South Africa - join. "We extend our hand to you to
make a real and just peace, not the militarist peace of coercion, the
generals peace".

There are just two roads leading to peace: A Palestinian states in the
borders of 1967, whose capital is Jerusalem, or the road taken in South
Africa - a democratic state shared by both nations. A third road does not
exist. "the settlement the Israeli leadership is seeking to impose on the
Palestinian negotiator could not be a settlement with the Palestinian
people... We will neither support nor accept it"

The writers of these words will be labelled here 'our enemies', because they
reject our peace proposals. Our columnists explain daily that the art of
negotiations requires toughness. So it is obvious and natural that we should
try to squeeze out of the Palestinian empire as many concessions as we can.

And squeezing has no limits. In 1995's Beilin-Abu Maazen plan for the final
settlement, it was agreed that Arafat will renounce, on behalf of the
Palestinians, any claim on Jerusalem, and the Palestinian institutions will
move to the village Abu-Dis, bordering with Jerusalem. In return, Arafat
will be allowed to call Abu-Dis the capital of the Palestinian state. When
Arafat declares he will never give up on Al-Kuds (Jerusalem), he means
Abu-dis (1). Already since 1998, he was led to believe that Abu-Dis will be
declared 'zone A' (Palestinian self-administration), in the nearest
"withdrawal".

But for Barak, this is not enough. Abu-Dis was not included in the last
package. Now he demands that first Arafat will agree that Israel will annex
officially all areas of Israeli settlements surrounding Jerusalem, and then,
maybe, he will get Abu-Dis, and declare from there the formation of the
state of the Palestinian ghettoes (2).

Same thing with Syria. For years it has been clear that as long as we do not
give up the Golan Heights and make peace with Syria, there will be no quiet
in the north. But behind the eyewash concerning Israel's readiness to
concessions, the only official document - the Shepherdstown document -
clarifies that Israel does not agree to evacuate the Golan settlements, or
allow Syrian sovereignty of any area in the Golan (3). It appears that Barak
seeks to impose on Asad the same kind of "peace" he offers Arafat. And if
Asad refuses, this means he does not really want peace, and the Israeli army
stands ready for the battle.

Barak is the most dangerous prime minister in the history of Israel. Already
in 1982 he proposed to extend the Lebanon war to a total war on Syria. Then
he explained (in a memorandum to Sharon) that the best way to do that is
without sharing the plans with the government. Today he is consulting only
with the heads of the army and the security services. Never had the army as
much grip on Israeli politics, as in the times of Barak.

According to an extensive poll reported in 'Yediot' (March 10, 00), 60% of
the Jewish Israelis are willing ot return all of the Golan Height and
evacuate all settlements for peace with Syria. A similar percentage
supported in the polls evacuation of settlements in the West Bank. But this
majority has no voice, since we do not have intellectuals of the magnitude
of the Palestinian intellectuals. Faced with the apartheid regime
established in the West Bank and Gaza, our intellectuals are still thrilled
and moved by "the historical compromise" we brought about with the
Palestinians. As for Syria, what can we do, given that Asad has not yet
managed to prove that he really, but really, loves Amos Oz (4).


 =======

Notes
(1)	E.g. in 'Haaretz' 5.5.98 (Akiva Eldar) it is reported that "Yaser Arafat
accepts the idea that the capital of the Palestinian state will be Abu-dis,
neighboring Jerusalem, and sees the understandings included in Beilin-Abu
maazen agreement as a realistic option for the final agreement with Israel".
"In a meeting with the Middle East section of the foreign affairs council
whose center is in New-York... Arafat was asked if it is possible to reach
an agreement with Israel also on the question of Jerusalem. Arafat:
'Certainly, it is possible to accept the idea of Abu-Dis, which belonged to
Al-Kuds also under Jordanian rule"
(2)	Haaretz, March 10, 00. Headline: "Barak offers Arafat: A state in return
to annexation of 10% of the West Bank"; Text: Barak offers "a limited
agreement by which Israel will recognize a Palestinian state declared in
parts of the West Bank and Gaza. In return, Israel will annex 10% of the
West Bank... (mainly the settlements surrounding Jerusalem...)". "Barak
assumes that if future negotiations will be carried out between two
sovereign states, the likelihood that they will be accompanied by violent
activity will be reduced."
(3)	The full draft of the Shepherdstown document, leaked out by the Israeli
government, appeared in 'haaretz' and 'yediot' on 13.1.00. More details can
be found in Reinhart's "This ain't the road of peace", January 16, ZNet
(http://www.zmag.org).
(4)	In an interview in Haaretz' weekend magazine (17.3.00), Amos Oz explains
that Asad shows no sensitivity to Israeli emotions - to "our sense of
isolation and humiliation". "Asad is doing his best to humiliate us, as if
it is not the Golan he wants, but that Barak will go out to him wearing
underwear, with his hands up.." Hence Oz declares that although he is in
principle for peace with Syria, he will not support it now.





Tanya Reinhart, 'Yediot', Mar 30 , 2000

MAKING PEACE WOULD MAKE MUCH MORE SENSE
By Tanya Reinhart

So nothing is going to come out of this peace. Only three months ago it
looked so feasible: to bring the soldiers back home, to stop renovating
shelters in the Galilee, to forget about the northern border, and
afterwards, peace like with Egypt - including, if you wish, visiting the
unseen Syrian landscapes. But that's not what will happen.

There are two narratives about what happened in the Clinton-Assad summit in
Geneva. Ours - the only one heard in Israel (and on CNN) - is that Assad
just doesn't want peace. "The masks have been unveiled", said Barak, "the
Syrian position is not ripe for the decisions which are necessary in order
to reach a peace treaty". Assad is insisting on those 500 meters in order to
humiliate us and derail the process.

The second narrative can be witnessed in Robert Fisk's report in the British
"Independent": "The two men held three hours of talks, through interpreters,
at the Intercontinental Hotel in Geneva, with the Syrian leader patiently
explaining he was not going to fall into the same 'peace' trap as the
Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat. He will not make
peace with Israel before guaranteeing the return of all of the occupied
Golan, captured by Israel in the 1967 Middle East war. Mr Arafat signed a
peace settlement then failed to gain a majority of the occupied West Bank or
a capital in Jerusalem."

In this narrative, the dispute is not over the 500 meters at all ("it was
conveyed on behalf of Assad that he is willing to compromise on the
withdrawal line, and even to full Israeli control over the whole of the
Kineret coast, while continuing to negotiate water rights"). The dispute is
over the model of the peace. There are two models in our history: in the
Egyptian model, all stages of the withdrawal and guarantees were finalized
before the treaty was signed (the later discussions concerned the autonomy
for the Palestinians). The withdrawal was set to spread over three years,
and only after 2/3 of Sinai was evacuated, embassies were set up. The Taba
issue remained. Both sides held it precious, and the Israelis used to spend
their vacations on its shores. That's why the decision regarding it was left
for the end.

In the Arafat model, the Oslo agreement was signed with almost nothing
agreed upon, besides Israeli declarations of principle about willingness for
a withdrawal. Seven years later, it turns out that the Palestinians have
halted the Intifadah, but Arafat didn't get anything of what was promised to
him in the west bank. What was realized was the autonomy plan which the
Palestinians always rejected.
Assad is saying that he will agree to a Sadat style peace, and not to an
Arafat style one. Barak is demanding that he will first sign, open embassies
and fight the Hizbollah. And then, if we will be satisfied, we will
withdraw. This is the Arafat model. Barak does not agree to the Sadat model.

So there is no peace. But without peace, Lebanon is the Israeli Vietnam, and
life in the northern towns is hell. But it's ok, there is an answer:
'unilateral withdrawal'. The US is threatening Syria that it is supporting
this plan, and has already begun to pressure Arab leaders to support it as
well. It is a little hard to understand why one needs to threaten anyone to
agree to an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon - what everybody in the region
has been demanding all along. But "unilateral withdrawal" is the code name
for a plan which Sharon has already proposed three years ago: we will
withdraw unilaterally while creating some kind of provocation (such as, not
fully withdraw) and then, with the first missile, we will go on a total war.
The world will be on our side, because we have withdrawn. Since our soldiers
are no longer there, it would now be possible to burn the earth from the
air.

Barak and others have mentioned this "Kosovo plan" several times. This is
what is being prepared in the north. And if it will prove necessary, "we
will also attack Syrian targets".

Barak and Sharon are counting on the fact that Assad is currently weak, and
his army is not what it used to be. So this time there will be no missiles
and no sealed rooms. Maybe they are right, but who wants to check? And if
they will succeed this time, how long will it last? Making peace by the
Sadat model would make much more sense. There is still time to stop this
summer's war.